Mental causation: a defence

If we accept causal exclusion, property dualism and physical determinism, mental epiphenomenalism follows. Accord-ing to Yablo (1992), we can save mental causation by rejecting causal exclusion and considering the mental/physical relation as an instance of the determinable/determinate relation. In this paper I ex-amine Crane’s argument (2008) against the causal relevance of de-terminables, and I argue that we still have good reasons to think that determinables may be causally efficacious. As mental properties can be also considered as exhaustive disjunctions of physical realizers, the causal relevance of mental properties is also questioned by the widely shared opinion that disjunctive properties can not be causally efficacious. I consider Clapp’s arguments (2001) in favor of the causal relevance of disjunctive properties, and I conclude that dis-junctive properties may survive both Armstrong’s famous objections (1978).