Dal dolo alternativo all'aberratio ictus: critica dell'indifferenza come contenuto del dolo

Indifference towards the legal interest is a defining feature of alternative intent and aberratio ictus – the concepts at the heart of the judgment in question – and is also characteristic of general intent and indirect intent. This essay examines the actual substance of this concept, highlights its semantic and substantive weaknesses, observes its instrumental function in specific contexts, and thus affirms its inability to express the content of intent. The instrumental use of indifference, and of the forms of intent into which it creeps, is accompanied by the aim of simplifying the burden of proof, which affects not only the structure but also, and at the same time, the object of intent: by impoverishing the object, the representational aspect is in turn impoverished and, consequently, the basis of the volitional aspect. Not even the homogeneity of the protected legal interest is capable of lending substance to indifference, since one can at best concede that such insensitivity is a mere emotional phase in the run-up to the conscious choice that represents the true essence of intent.