Publication Date:
2014
Short description:
La fisica come modello per il dritto? / Buffoni, Laura. - In: OSSERVATORIO SULLE FONTI. - ISSN 2038-5633. - 1(2014), pp. 1-21.
abstract:
The article aims to discuss the theory presented by professor Roberto
Bin in the book “A discrezione del giudice. Ordine e disordine. Una prospettiva
quantistica” (Milano, Franco Angeli, 2013), according to which physical metaphors
and intuitions can improve our comprehension of legal issues. In his book Professor
Bin uses some paradigmatic shifts in physics (such as relativity theory and quantum
physics) to illustrate the need of a revised constitutional theory. He argues, as Professor
Lawrence Tribe firstly did in a famous essay of 1989, that scholars and lawyers
can learn form modern physics, and, in particular, from quantum physics, to
undermine the confidence of scientists in their ability to observe a phenomenon without
altering it.
Although agreeing with the heuristic ramification of the philosophy of science for
legal studies and considering these metaphors as stimulating new studies, the Author
argues that it is not correct to refer to natural sciences, such as physics, to leave the
objective image of legal universe and particularly of constitutional issues. This is
true, mainly because there is not an epistemological hierarchy between natural and
social sciences. Even the scientific decisions borrow methodological options from
the post-positivism science law – especially from the discursive theory of legal justification.
In this perspective, at the opposite, natural sciences have to refer to legal
doctrine.
Bin in the book “A discrezione del giudice. Ordine e disordine. Una prospettiva
quantistica” (Milano, Franco Angeli, 2013), according to which physical metaphors
and intuitions can improve our comprehension of legal issues. In his book Professor
Bin uses some paradigmatic shifts in physics (such as relativity theory and quantum
physics) to illustrate the need of a revised constitutional theory. He argues, as Professor
Lawrence Tribe firstly did in a famous essay of 1989, that scholars and lawyers
can learn form modern physics, and, in particular, from quantum physics, to
undermine the confidence of scientists in their ability to observe a phenomenon without
altering it.
Although agreeing with the heuristic ramification of the philosophy of science for
legal studies and considering these metaphors as stimulating new studies, the Author
argues that it is not correct to refer to natural sciences, such as physics, to leave the
objective image of legal universe and particularly of constitutional issues. This is
true, mainly because there is not an epistemological hierarchy between natural and
social sciences. Even the scientific decisions borrow methodological options from
the post-positivism science law – especially from the discursive theory of legal justification.
In this perspective, at the opposite, natural sciences have to refer to legal
doctrine.
Iris type:
1.1 Articolo in rivista
List of contributors:
Buffoni, Laura
Published in: