Per un nuovo bicameralismo, tra esigenze di sistema e problemi relativi al procedimento legislativo

The aim of the essay is to deal with the problem of the reform of the second chamber in the Italian constitutional framework. As is well known, the transformation of the Italian Senate into a regional chamber has long been one of the main points in public debate. On the necessity of such a transformation there is a broad consensus. Notwithstanding, even though such an agreement has been reached, we are agreeing on very little, because this idea can be realized in several different ways.
The essay holds that – if we continue to wish for a strong system of territorial autonomies – alongside the first chamber we have to put a second chamber capable of reaching the following aims: a) to be an institution at the centre of the system, while being able to reconcile the point of view of the State and the points of view of the Regions, in order to prevent the former’s political choices from being a mere imposition on the latter’s; b) to realize a trade-off between the exercising of legislative competences by the Regions and their participation in the making of political choices at the center of the system; c) to reduce the number of legal disputes in front of the Constitutional Court between State and Regions, and to increase the federal loyalty of the latter; d) to realize a better connection between the political choices of the State and those of the Regions, also in order to obtain a better implementation of the former by the latter; e) to fulfill article 5 of the Italian Constitution, adapting the central legislation to the principles and methods of autonomy.
The essay holds that a Senate directly elected by the people is unable to reach these objectives. Instead, it is necessary to choose a way in which to closely link the point of view of each senator to the political point of view of the respective regional institutions. In order to do this, it is imperative to set a rule whereby each member of a regional delegation must vote in the same way. In the matter of the appointment of the members, two paths are possible. We could follow the model of the German Bundesrat, even though it is quite unpopular in Italian public debate. As a second possibility, regional councils could be given the task of electing senators, while also ensuring a seat for a member of the political opposition, and a seat for the President of the Region.
Finally, the essay underlines the risks inherent in the multiplication of legislative processes resulting from the end of Italian ‘perfect bicameralism’, and suggests a way to reduce the possibility of legal conflicts related to the choice between monocameral and bicameral approval. To avoid that risk, the essay recommends the constitution of a joint commitee whose task it is to choose the correct legislative process in cases of disagreement.