Delegation, externalities and organizational design

Articolo
Data di Pubblicazione:
2009
Citazione:
Delegation, externalities and organizational design / Gautier, A; Paolini, Dimitri. - In: ECONOMICS BULLETIN. - ISSN 1545-2921. - 29:(2009), pp. 2693-2702.
Abstract:
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter- agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
Tipologia CRIS:
1.1 Articolo in rivista
Elenco autori:
Autori di Ateneo:
Link alla scheda completa:
https://iris.uniss.it/handle/11388/84125
Pubblicato in:
ECONOMICS BULLETIN
Journal